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1 Facts of the Case
On August 17, 1993, the United States Department of Commerce
(USDOC) imposed definitive countervailing duties (CVDs) on carbon
steel originating in Germany. The imposition of these duties was based on
an investigation by USDOC in which it was determined that certain
German producers had benefited from five countervailable subsidy
programs at a total ad valorem rate of 0.60 percent.
On September 1, 1999, the USDOC gave notice of the automatic
initiation of a sunset review of these duties, in accordance with Article
21.3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM
Agreement).1 The United States found, in the course of its review, that
* We are grateful to the ALI reporters and especially to Richard Baldwin, Bill Ethier,
Bernard Hoekman and Jasper-Martijn Wauters for useful comments on previous drafts.
Remaining errors are our own.
1 Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement reads, in relevant part: ‘‘. . . any definitive
countervailing duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its
imposition (or from the date of its most recent review under paragraph 2 if that review
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withdrawal of CVDs would have led to a recurrence of subsidization and
injury. The USDOC calculated the amount of countervailable subsidy to be
0.54% ad valorem, inasmuch as two of the original five subsidy programs
had been terminated between the time of the original investigation and that
of the administrative review.
2 Issues raised before the Panel
The European Communities complained that the US review was incon-
sistent with US obligations under the SCM Agreement. In the view of the
European Communities, the United States should have withdrawn the
CVDs when they found that the amount of countervailable subsidy to be
0.54% ad valorem. The European Communities argued that Article 11.9 of
the SCM Agreement provided support for its argument in this respect;
Article 11.9 obligesWTOMembers to terminate original subsidy investiga-
tions when the amount of subsidy is calculated to fall below a de minimis
standard of 1% ad valorem. According to the European Communities, the
same standard ought to apply to subsequent sunset reviews as well. Not
only was US practice in violation of the SCM Agreement, argued the
European Communities, but the US law, which prescribes a de minimis
standard of 0.5% ad valorem for sunset reviews, was illegal as well. Thus, the
European Communities claimed that the United States had violated both
Article 21.3 and Article 32.5 of the SCMAgreement, the latter requiring that
each Member take measures to ensure the conformity of its laws and
procedures with the terms of the Agreement.
The European Communities further complained about the evidentiary
standard set out in US law and applied in its sunset reviews. In its opinion,
the standard used by the United States for automatic self-initiation of
sunset reviews falls short of the requirements of Articles 21.3 and 10 of the
SCM Agreement.
Finally, the European Communities complained that the United
States had violated its obligations under Articles 21.4 and 12 of the
SCM Agreement when it considered the likelihood of continuation or
has covered both subsidization and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the
authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or
upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a
reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury. The duty may remain in
force pending the outcome of such a review.’’
united states  countervailing duties 65
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745605001230
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 21:52:53, subject to the Cambridge Core
recurrence of subsidization in the event of removal of countervailing
duties by not allowing ample opportunity for interested parties to present
their views in the context of the sunset review.
3 The Panel Decision
TheWTO Panel rejected the EC arguments that US evidentiary standards
were inconsistent with Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement, that US law
concerning the obligation to determine the likelihood of continuation of
recurrence of subsidization in sunset review is inconsistent with Article
21.3 of the SCM Agreement, and that the United States had violated its
obligation under the SCM Agreement by failing to provide interested
parties with an opportunity to present their views. Regarding the last of
these findings, the Panel noted that the European Communities had not
included the issue among its list of complaints when requesting the
establishment of a panel, and thus the issue did not fall within its terms
of reference per Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
On the other hand, the Panel found that the United States had violated
its obligations under the SCM Agreement by not adhering to a de minimis
standard of 1.0% in its sunset review. The Panel ruled that the United
States had violated both Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement in the specific
instance under review, and also had violated Article 32.5 by failing to
bring its laws into conformity with the terms of the Agreement.
Finally, the Panel found that the United States had failed to determine
properly the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidization in
its sunset review and thus had acted in a manner inconsistent with Article
21.3. It should be emphasized that the Panel’s finding in this respect
concerns US practice and not the US law as such, which the Panel
found to be consistent with the US obligations under the SCMAgreement.
4 The Appeal and the Appellate Body Decision
Both sides appealed aspects of the Panel decision, although the United
States did not contest the Panel ruling that it had failed to determine
properly the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidization in
this particular case. The United States appealed the Panel findings that a
1.0% de minimis standard applies to ad valorem subsidy rates in a sunset
review. The European Communities contested the Panel finding that the
evidentiary standards used by the United States in its sunset review are not
inconsistent with its WTO obligations, and that the US laws concerning
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the procedures to be used in determining likelihood of continuation of
recurrence of subsidization in sunset review are not inconsistent with
the SCM.
In United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany (WTO Doc. WT/DS213/AB/R,
henceforth Carbon Steel), the Appellate Body upheld all but one of the
Panel’s findings; it reversed only the finding that the United States had
acted in a manner inconsistent with its obligations by failing to apply a de
minimis standard 1% ad valorem in its sunset review of the case under
dispute. According to the AB, the SCM Agreement imposes no restriction
on the size of a subsidy that can be subject to continued countervailing
measures, provided the subsidies continue to cause or threaten to cause
injury in the importing country.
Since the Panel had ruled that the United States had failed to determine
properly the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidization in
the particular sunset review at issue in this case, and since this finding
generated no appeal from the United States, the AB requested that the
United States bring its measures in Carbon Steel into conformity with its
WTO obligations.
5 Discussion of the AB Decision
5.1 The function of sunset reviews
In a report last year [see Grossman and Mavroidis (2003)], we discussed
the role of countervailing duties in the global trading system. We con-
cluded that
. . . the effect of a subsidy on aggregate welfare in another Member country
is a priori ambiguous. Therefore, if the Members had intended the SCM
Agreement to discourage actions that would inflict welfare losses on others,
they would have directed the ‘‘test’’ for actionable subsidies toward identi-
fying conditions where aggregate loss is most likely to occur. For example,
an external welfare loss is more likely to occur when a government sub-
sidizes firms that sell in an imperfectly competitive market. So the test for
an actionable subsidy might have made reference to the competitive con-
ditions of the subsidized industry. Similarly, a welfare loss is more likely
when wages are sticky in the importing country than when they are flexible;
so the Agreement might have made reference to the labor-market condi-
tions there. The Agreement might also have allowed for countervailing
measures in Member countries that export goods in competition with the
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subsidized good, inasmuch as these countries are quite likely to suffer
welfare losses as a result of a foreign subsidy.
In fact, the SCMAgreement does not confine the use of CVDs to situations
in which an importing country has established the presumption of a welfare
loss. The Agreement makes no reference to labor-market conditions, to
market structure, or even to consumer welfare. And the Agreement makes
no allowance for countervailing measures in countries that export the sub-
sidized good, where the presumption of welfare losses surely exists.2 Rather,
countervailing measures are permitted only when there has been (or threat-
ens to be) injury to a domestic industry in an importing country.
The observation that injury to import-competing interests provides the
sole basis for countervailing action points to a different interpretation of the
objective of the SCMAgreement. Evidently, the signatories meant to discour-
age certain policy actions that would harm competing producer interests in
the importing country. This objective is understandable in the light of recent
literature on the political economy of trade policy, which has emphasized
that governments often set their trade policies with objectives other than the
maximization of aggregate economic welfare in mind. The policies that are
chosen typically reflect a compromise among competing constituent inter-
ests. Moreover, some interests – especially those that are relatively concen-
trated – receive more weight in the political process than others. Less
concentrated groups are not so successful in the political arena, in part
because they have difficulty in overcoming the free-rider problems that
plague collective political action (Olson, 1965). Thus, governments often
are induced by political pressures to give more weight to producer interests
than to consumer welfare when making their decisions about trade policy.
(emphasis in the original)
The SCMAgreement provides for twomeans of terminating a countervailing
duty (CVD). First, the imposition of a CVD might end following a self-
initiated or requested administrative review, as provided for in Article 21.2.
2 Although the Agreement recognizes the possibility of serious prejudice to the interests of
another Member that may arise due to the displacement of exports of a like product to
the market of the subsidizing Member or to a third-country market, it does not allow
serious prejudice to exporting interests to be a basis for countervailing action. Rather, in
such cases, the Agreement calls for consultations between the Member that is granting or
maintaining a subsidy and the Complaining Member, followed by a panel review in the
event that consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution. Only after a report
by a panel or Appellate Body has been adopted in which it is determined that a subsidy
has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another Member, and the subsidizing
Member has failed to take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the subsidy
may the complaining Member take such countermeasures as have been authorized by the
Dispute Settlement Body (see Articles 7.8 and 7.9 of the SCM Agreement).
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Second, a CVD might be allowed to lapse after five years or be terminated
following a sunset review conducted at that time. Article 21.3 stipulates that
any definitive countervailing duty shall be terminated on a date not
later than five years from its imposition . . . unless the authorities deter-
mine . . . that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation
or recurrence of subsidization and injury
(emphasis added)
Thus, the Agreement incorporates a rebuttable presumption that protec-
tion will no longer be needed after a period of five years. In order to
continue a CVD beyond that time, the competent authorities must con-
duct a review in which they find that continued application of the duty is
necessary to prevent a recurrence of the injurious effects of the subsidy.
Our analysis of the role of CVDs applies to sunset reviews just as it does
to the initial investigation inasmuch as the injury standard is the same in
both cases. We find support for this claim, for example, in footnote 45 of
the SCM Agreement, which reads:
Under this Agreement the term ‘injury’ shall, unless otherwise specified, be
taken to mean material injury to domestic industry, threat of material
injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment
of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Article
(emphasis added)
Since Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement concerning sunset reviews does
not specify otherwise, we must conclude that the Members intended the
same standards to apply in such reviews.
5.2 De minimis standards in sunset reviews
5.2.1 The Panel’s reasoning
Whereas the SCM Agreement provides for a de minimis threshold of 1%
ad valorem in all original investigations of countervailable subsidies,3 it
makes no explicit reference to any such standard in the body of Article 21,
which provides for the sunset reviews. The US trade law respects the
3 Article 11.9 states that ‘‘. . .There shall be immediate termination [of an initial
investigation] in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis, or where the volume
of subsidized imports, actual or potential, is negligible. For the purpose of this paragraph,
the amount of the subsidy shall be considered to be de minimis if the subsidy is less than
1 per cent ad valorem.’’
united states  countervailing duties 69
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745605001230
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 21:52:53, subject to the Cambridge Core
stipulated 1% threshold for original subsidy investigations, but provides
for a lower 0.5% threshold for all subsequent reviews.
The Panel nonetheless found that theUnited States had acted in amanner
inconsistent with its obligations under the SCM Agreement by employing a
de minimis threshold of 0.5% ad valorem in its sunset review of a CVD on
certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel products from Germany. The Panel
ruled that the WTOMembers intended the 1% threshold to apply not only
in original investigations, but also in all subsequent reviews. According to
the Panel, the Members could not have meant for there to be two different
standards at the different points in time. Rather, the Panel interpreted the
silence in Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement as tacit acceptance of the
standard laid out in the earlier Article 11.9.
The Panel supported its interpretation by asserting that the SCM
Agreement aims, inter alia, to counteract injurious subsidies.4 Since the
Members had decided to set a de minimis standard of 1.0% ad valorem for
the original investigation, they must have believed that subsidies at less
than this rate could not cause injury sufficient to warrant countervailing
measures. Arguably, a subsidy at less than 1% ad valorem also could not
cause such injury at a later stage.5 The Panel concluded that, since only
subsidies that are causing injury can be subject to CVDs, de minimis
subsidies that cannot cause sufficient injury (as defined in Article 11.9)
cannot be deemed countervailable.
5.2.2 The AB reversal: silence must mean something
The AB rejected the Panel’s reasoning on the issue of de minimis thresh-
olds in sunset reviews. The AB advanced several arguments to support its
position.
First, the AB argued that the Agreement’s silence in Article 21 on the
issue of de minimis thresholds for sunset reviews must have meaning. In
4 In support of this point, the Panel pointed to a negotiating document prepared by the
WTO Secretariat during the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations. This
document offered two rationales for the introduction of de minimis standards, one of
which was to ensure that CVDs would counteract only injurious subsidies; see para. 77 of
Carbon Steel.
5 The preparatory work for the SCM Agreement suggests that the de minimis standard was
incorporated into the agreement to preclude the use of its provisions as a form of
harassment. The signatories felt that Members should not be allowed to proceed with an
investigation in situations where, arguably, the injurious effects of a subsidy could not
have been great in view of the low rate of subsidization. It is impossible to discern from
the preparatory work, however, the basis for setting the threshold at 1% rather than at
some other level.
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particular, the AB notes that cross-referencing would have been an option,
and indeed has been used quite frequently in the SCM Agreement. The AB
interprets the absence of such cross-referencing to mean that the Members
did not intend the threshold requirements incorporated into Article 11.9 to
apply also to the reviews discussed in Article 21.
Second, the AB dismissed the relevance of the negotiating document cited
by the Panel inasmuch as the documents list the counteracting of injurious
subsidies as only one of two rationales for the introduction of de minimis
thresholds in the original investigation. The AB notes in para. 78 of its report
onCarbon Steel that there is no reason for the interpreter of Article 21 to rely
on this particular rationale for de minimis thresholds while dismissing the
other. The AB further argues (in paras. 79–81) that, as a matter of general
matter, subsidy and injury are two distinct concepts in the SCM Agreement
and the latter is not defined with reference to any minimum ad valorem
subsidy rate. The Agreement also distinguishes the original investigation and
subsequent reviews as two distinct processes with their own rules and
procedures. The AB sees no a priori reason why the requirements for
invoking countervailing duties should be the same in the two processes.
The AB concludes that the US law, which provides for a de minimis
threshold of 0.5% ad valorem for a subsidy to be countervailable following
a sunset review, is not inconsistent with US obligations under Article 21.3
of the SCM Agreement.
5.2.3 In support of the AB ruling
There are additional arguments that support the AB ruling on the use of
de minimis thresholds in sunset reviews. First, the maxim of in dubio pro
mitius favors the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the SCM Agreement.
According to this maxim of public international law, the international
judge, because of his/her function (as an agent, not a principal) cannot
presume a transfer of sovereignty when none is present. The interpreter,
when in doubt (in dubio), must interpret an international agreement
narrowly; that is, assuming that sovereignty remains with the states rather
than assuming that it has been transferred to the international regime (pro
mitius). Legislative silence presents at least genuine doubt as to whether
sovereignty has been transferred. The maxim of in dubio pro mitius
reflects an intellectually coherent proposition in the light of the frequent
challenges of the purview of the international regime that are brought
before international courts. And whereas an ill-advised judgment by a
domestic court in a national context can readily be overturned via
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subsequent legislative action, a poor decision by an adjudicating body of
the WTO will require, before it can be corrected, a consensus among 146
Member countries. Since agency costs associated with poor judicial deci-
sions are especially high in an international context, it behooves an
international court to let sovereignty remain with the Member countries
whenever a legitimate doubt exists.
Second, the interpretation favored by the ABmay well be consistent with
the overall objectives of the SCM Agreement as applied to the issue of de
minimis thresholds. As we explained in Grossman and Mavroidis (2003)
and rehearsed in Section 5.1 above, CVDs play an important role in the
international trading system not only to offset injury, but also to discourage
countries from implementing subsidies that might cause harm to a domes-
tic industry in an importing country in the first place. Subsidies are not per
se illegal in the international trading regime. Rather, countervailing duties
are permitted to ensure that governments have adequate incentive to con-
sider the externalities that their national policies impose on their trading
partners. The longer lasting the CVDs, the greater the disincentive to a
government to implement subsidies that do harm to their trade partners. It
is at least plausible that theWTOMembers intended to allow countervailing
measures against small subsidies as a way to discourage governments from
keeping subsidies in place longer than is necessary. Since the Agreement is
silent on the issue of whether deminimis thresholds ought to apply in sunset
reviews, it is enough that a plausible case can be made that no such thresh-
olds were intended to justify the overturning of the Panel’s ruling by the AB.
Finally, the wording of footnote 52 (to Article 21.3 of the SCMAgreement)
seems to lend support to the Appellate Body’s approach. It provides that
[w]hen the amount of the countervailing duty is assessed on a retrospective
basis, a finding in the most recent assessment proceeding that no duty is to be
levied shall not by itself require the authorities to terminate the definitive duty.
If a finding that no duty should be levied does not in and of itself require
that the authorities terminate the duties imposed, then by inference a
finding of de minimis subsidization should lead to the same result.6
6 This point was made to us orally by Jasper-Martijn Wauters. We should probably note
that our comments here assume the legal text as a constraint on the Appellate Body’s
decision. In fact, we can see some good arguments in favor of the Panel’s position (that
was overturned by the AB) that a subsidy scheme, when below a de minimis level defined
in the SCM Agreement, should be regarded as non-injurious during both the original
investigation and subsequent reviews. However, the language of Article 21.3 of the SCM
Agreement does not lend sufficient support to these arguments.
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5.3 Evidentiary standards in self-initiated sunset reviews
TheUS law provides for automatic self-initiation of sunset reviews 30 days
before the fifth anniversary of the original imposition of a CVD, regard-
less of whether the USDOC is in possession of any relevant evidence or
not. The European Communities disputed the consistency of the US
legislation with the terms of the SCM Agreement. According to the
European Communities, the evidentiary standards stipulated in Article
11.6 of the SCM Agreement as requirements before an investigatory
authority can itself initiate an original investigation of a foreign sub-
sidy ought to apply as well to the self-initiation by such authorities
of a sunset review. Specifically, the European Communities claimed that
the United States, if it wishes to self-initiate a sunset review, should possess
the same level of information as would be required in a ‘‘duly substan-
tiated request’’ for a review by the domestic industry. The Panel rejected
the EC claims, ruling that Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement dictates no
specific evidentiary standards for the self-initiation of sunset reviews.
The AB upheld the Panel’s ruling on appeal. It pointed to the wording
of Article 21.3, which mandates the elimination of CVDs after five years
‘‘unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on
their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on
behalf of the domestic industry.’’ The AB argued that the adjective ‘‘duly
substantiated’’ modifies only the ‘‘request made by or on behalf of the
domestic industry’’ and not the alternative method described for initiat-
ing a sunset review, namely self-initiation by the investigating authorities.
Again, the AB interpreted silence to mean that the provision places no
limitation on the manner in which the Member country may take the
indicated action.
In our view, the most persuasive argument in support of the Panel’s
decision was not mentioned in the report on Carbon Steel.When it comes
to the original investigation, Articles 11.2 and 11.6 of the SCM Agreement
establish a balance between investigations initiated following a request by
the domestic industry and self-initiated investigations. Whereas an indus-
try petition can generate a subsidy investigation whenever certain sub-
stantive requirements are satisfied, government-initiated investigations
are reserved for exceptional cases. On this point, Article 11.6 of the SCM
Agreement states that
If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an
investigation without having received a written application by or on behalf
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of a domestic industry for the initiation of such investigation, they shall
proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy,
injury and causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation
of an investigation
Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement does not, however, treat self-initiated
sunset reviews as exceptional procedures. A coherent argument could be
advanced in favor of a parallelism between the two provisions: absent an
abiding interest by the domestic industry (the entity which has the
incentive to request protection) an investigating authority should neither
initiate an investigation nor review duties to evaluate whether they are still
needed, except in unusual circumstances. In other words, if the domestic
industry fails to take the initiative to request the application of a CVD or
its continuation, the competent authorities should take this as a signal
that trade protection would not be especially beneficial to the industry. In
such circumstances, no CVD should be applied or continued, considering
that such protection confers negative externalities on a Member’s trading
partners.
But whereas Article 11.6 of the SCM Agreement treats the initiation
of an investigation by the government authorities as an exceptional
event, Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement does not do so. This discrep-
ancy provides a rationale for a looser evidentiary standard during the
review stage. The degree of leniency that should be allowed relative to
the requirements of Article 11.2 of the SCM Agreement is a matter
that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The AB chose to inter-
pret silence literally as an absence of any requirement whatsoever, so
that competent authorities may choose to conduct sunset reviews
even when they are in possession of no evidence to suggest that the
CVD is still needed. Their interpretation certainly cannot be rejected
based on a contextual reading of the text of Article 21.3 of the SCM
Agreement.
5.4 The likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidization
The European Communities further argued that US law and practice
essentially prohibit the USDOC from examining changes to the subsidy
programs that may occur subsequent to an initial investigation. Several of
the EC claims were rejected by the Panel and the AB, because they were
not properly raised during the dispute process. The AB also rejected the
appeal by the European Communities that faulted the Panel for failing to
condemn a ‘‘consistent practice’’ on the part of the United States as
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regards changes to subsidy programs. The AB noted that, in making this
assertion, the European Communities had relied primarily on the US
conduct in the case under review. Such US actions, whatever they may
have been, could not amount to a ‘‘consistent practice.’’
The European Communities had argued that US trade law [Section
752(b)(1) of the US Tariff Act] does not allow the USDOC to consider
changes in subsidy programs when determining the likelihood of con-
tinuation or recurrence of subsidization. The Panel relied on the language
of the law to conclude that it did not, in fact, mandate behavior incon-
sistent with Article 21.3 of the SCMAgreement. The AB upheld this ruling,
and we concur.
5.5 The opportunity to present evidence in sunset reviews
The European Communities complained that, during the Panel pro-
ceedings, the United States had violated its obligations under Article 12
of the SCM Agreement by not providing interested parties with
ample opportunity to present their views. The United States objected
to this claim, arguing that it fell outside the Panel’s terms of the reference
inasmuch as the issue had not been raised at the time that the European
Communities invoked the dispute resolution process. The United States
referred to Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) for
support on this issue.
In reviewing the EC request for the establishment of a panel, the Panel
found only a reference to an objection to ‘‘certain aspects of the review
procedure.’’ The Panel did not find this reference to be sufficiently
specific to identify the issue at hand. In the case law on the issue of the
Panel’s terms of reference, the WTO adjudicating bodies have consist-
ently interpreted Article 6.2 of the DSU as requiring complainants to
identify the factual situation about which they complain and the legal
provision that allegedly has been violated in the document submitted to
request a panel. Accordingly, the Panel ruled in favor of the United
States on this issue.
On appeal, the AB upheld the Panel ruling, on the grounds that the EC
request for establishment of a panel had failed to identify Article 12 of the
SCM Agreement as the basis for its contention that its rights had been
violated. We agree with the Panel and the AB on this finding, noting that
were Article 6.2 of the DSU to be interpreted otherwise, complainants
would be able to surprise defendants with new allegations at all the stages
of the dispute settlement proceedings.
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6 Conclusions
We concur with the AB findings about the non-applicability of de minimis
thresholds in sunset review and have developed some additional argu-
ments to support its ruling. We also concur with the AB findings on
evidentiary standards during reviews. Both of our conclusions are predi-
cated on our understanding of the function of (or, the objectives pursued
by) the SCM Agreement as currently drafted.
This does not mean, however, that we agree with the current drafting
of the SCM Agreement on the issues under review. In fact, we see good
arguments in favor of a re-drafting of Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement
in two respects.
(a) The Agreement should make clear that, the absence of de minimis
standards notwithstanding, if the level of subsidization is found to
have fallen over time, then the size of the CVD should shrink as well
after the sunset review (since the purpose of a CVD is to offset the
‘‘distortion’’ caused by the subsidy and not to (over-)compensate the
affected domestic industry). As Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement
now stands, it is unclear whether, in case the level of subsidization
changes over time, the size of the countervailing duty must change as
well.
(b) The evidentiary standards during the sunset review stage should be
changed to restore parallelism with the standards used during ori-
ginal investigations initiated by industry petition and those initiated
by the investigating authority. A lack of interest by the domestic
industry in continuing a CVD action should be used as a signal that
no further protection is warranted. As the text now stands, it is
difficult to advance a convincing legal argument in favor of such
parallelism.
7 Post Scriptum
We note that, in a subsequent dispute concerning a review of antidump-
ing duties, the AB reached a conclusion that might be regarded as being at
odds with the decision discussed here. Like the SCM Agreement, the AD
Agreement incorporates a de minimis threshold for the dumping margin
at the investigatory stage leading to the original imposition of duties, but
contains no explicit reference to any de minimis standards that must be
applied during a sunset review. In its report on United States – Sunset
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the AB reaffirmed in xx 124–127 its view that a competent authority is not
obliged by the agreement to calculate precise dumping margins during a
review of antidumping duties. It went on, however, to specify that in case
a WTO Member does choose to calculate margins in such a review, it
must do so in accordance with the procedures stipulated in Article 2 of the
AD. Article 2 regulates the procedures for calculating the dumping mar-
gin during an original investigation and constitutes one of the three
prerequisites for the lawful imposition of antidumping duties under
Article 1 of the AD. But Article 1 further stipulates that Article 5 must
govern the conduct of an investigation, and Article 5.8 contains the de
minimis rule that obligesWTOMembers to discontinue any investigation
if they find the dumping margin to be below 2%. Consequently, any
definition of the dumping margin that accords with Article 2 of the AD
must obey the de minimis threshold reflected in Article 5.8. In short, it is
possible to interpret the AB ruling in the AD case as requiring the de
minimis standard for an initial investigation also to be observed in any
sunset review that involves the calculation of dumping margins.
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